Content extract
Source: http://www.doksinet Environmentalism Elliott Sober criticizes environmentalism for claiming that we have obligations to protect entire species or ecosystems. The environmentalist, Sober claims, is faced with what what he calls “The Demarcation Problem”: The Demarcation Problem: In order for the environmentalist position to be a sensible one, it must do 3 things: (1) Identify which things matter, morally, and which do not, (2) Explain which properties or features those individuals have that give rise to our moral duties toward them, and (3) This must not result in the conclusion that we have moral obligations toward ALL things. For instance, if the environmentalist wants the conclusion that we have moral reasons to preserve a mountain range, but not a parking garage, they will need to provide a theory which provides REASONS for this, and accurately delivers this conclusion. So, let’s now continue the conversation begun in the Russow article, and ask, “Why do species or
ecosystems matter, morally?” 1. Suffering: One reason to protect nature is that, by failing to do so, SUFFFERING will occur. For instance, destroying ecosystems causes animals to suffer and die Reply: But, environmentalists are typically not concerned with suffering overall. Perhaps PART of what environmentalists call for can be explained by harm (e.g, not using animal traps that cause pain to animals, or refraining from factory farming), much of what they claim cannot be so explained. First, much of the environment cannot feel pain; for instance, forests, mountains, and rivers do not feel pain. And yet, environmentalists promote their preservation Second, even with animals that DO feel pain, an environmentalist might think it is FAR worse to kill an animal of an endangered species than it is to kill that of another, even if doing so causes equal amounts of pain. Consider, for example, this story, about killing off non-threatened barred owls to provide habtitats for threatened
spotted owls. Clearly, the environmentalist position for preservation of species is not really grounded in the pain and suffering that occurs when a species is lost. 2. Ignorance: In the last section, we saw that many species have proven themselves to have instrumental value (e.g, leading to medicinal benefits, or as keystone species, etc) Many environmentalists claim that, even if we cannot NOW point to any particular benefits of a certain species or ecosystem, by failing to preserve them, there is a chance 1 Source: http://www.doksinet that we will forever lose this great benefit that they provide. We simply cannot KNOW for certain what the effects of extinction or ecological destruction will be. Reply: Elliott Sober claims that it is irrational to believe that we ought to protect something when we have no reason to think that doing so would be beneficial. The mere POSSIBILITY of a benefit is not enoughespecially when the possible benefit is very UNLIKELY. In short, it would be
irrational to forego a CERTAIN benefit based on the possibility of a very UNLIKELY cost. We take calculated risks like this all the time. To illustrate, consider that, even though there is the very small chance that the plane you are about to take will crash, you ride it anyway. The benefit of flying is great enough that it is not irrational to ride on one He writes, “We are prepared to accept a small chance of a great disaster in return for the high probability of a rather modest benefit. If this is rational, no wonder that we might consistently be willing to allow a species to go extinct in order to build a hydroelectric plant.” Furthermore, in real life examples, environmentalists are often fighting to preserve some endangered species that we are fairly certain has NO benefits, who inhabit a very small area, and whose population is very smallsuch that the probability of some disaster is not unknown, but rather known to be almost zero. Consider, for instance, the fight to save
the California condor, or this story about spending $1.25 million to build a rope and tube bridge system over a highway in near Mount Graham, Arizona, in order to save about 5 red squirrels per year from roadkill (an endangered species, of which there are only about 250 individuals remaining). So, environmentalists do not really rely on the ignorance argument in many actual cases (i.e, they do not say, “we should save them because, for all we know, not saving them will be the loss of the next cure for cancer, or the collapse of an entire ecosystem, etc.”) 3. The Slippery Slope: If I eat one potato chip, I’ll probably want another And then another. And then another Until they’re all gone With potato chips, it’s either all or nothing. If you’re like me, then you can’t have just one You can have none, or you can eat an entire bag. Some environmentalists claim that the destruction of species is like that; a slippery slope. They argue something like: 2 Source:
http://www.doksinet 1. If it is morally permissible to destroy one species, then it is morally permissible to destroy ALL of the species. 2. Clearly, it is not morally permissible to destroy ALL of the species 3. Therefore, it is not morally permissible to destroy ONE species Why would this be? The first premise is grounded in a problem of vagueness. The idea is that, if killing one species would be permissible, then surely killing two would be permissible. But, then, surely killing THREE would be permissible And, since there is no exact line to be drawn at which it goes from permissible to IMpermissible, it must be permissible to kill ALL of them. The abortion debate contains a similar premise Antiabortionists point out that, clearly it is morally wrong to kill a newborn baby But, then, surely it is also wrong to kill an unborn baby a few minutes before birth. But, then, surely it is wrong to kill it a few minutes before that; and so on, until we conclude that it must be wrong to
kill a fertilized egg that is a few minutes old, because there is no clear place to draw the line. Reply: This is a mistaken line of reasoning. It is often the case that, even if we cannot find the dividing line between where something changes from one extreme to the other, this does not entail that the extremes themselves do not exist. Consider: Stage 1: I have a full head of hair, with 100,000 hairs Stage 2: I pluck one hair, so that I have 99,999 hairs on my head. Stage 3: I pluck another hair, so that I have 99,998 hairs on my head. Stage 4: I pluck another hair . Stage 100,000: I have no hairs at all. I am bald Ask this question: At what stage did I go from being not-bald to bald? It seems impossible to locate the specific point at which this occurredi.e, there is no clear LINE to be drawn between not-bald and baldbut we should not conclude from this that there is NO DIFFERENCE between having a full head of hair and baldness. Similarly, if we admit that killing off one species is
permissible, we should not conclude from this that killing ALL of them is also permissible. Just because there is no clear line to be drawn does not entail that there is no moral difference between killing off one species, and all 8.7 million species on the planet At most, Sober suggests that what we need to do is assess each extinction on a case-by-case basis. While it might be deemed permissible to cause the extinction of the snail darter now in order to reap the benefits of more jobs and renewable energy, in the future, as fewer and fewer species remain, the destruction of a similar small fish might be seen as too high a price to pay for a similar benefit. 3 Source: http://www.doksinet 4. Natural vs Unnatural: Many environmentalists imply by their actions that so-called “natural” species and habitats are of greater value than “unnatural” ones. For instance, they would put up less of a fuss over the extinction of some domesticated breed or subspecies of household dog than
they would about a sub-species of wild rhinoceros (such as the black rhino subspecies). [Is this true? Some have taken tremendous efforts to re-establish the populations of dog breeds that were nearly lost.] No matter the case, it is certain that environmentalists favor preserving and restoring “natural” habitats and environments. But, there seem to be only two good candidates: Natural = Without human intervention. But, then, any attempt to intervene to prevent “natural” death or disease is bad. What is more, “restoration” projects would be fundamentally misguided (since restoration is a human activity). Natural = Whatever occurs in nature. But, then, this would not rule out ANY human activity, since human beings themselves (and their activity) occur in nature. As we have already seen, this distinction is a notoriously slippery one. 5. Needs and Interests: Another proposal that we have already looked at is that which says that species and ecosystems have
“interests” or “needs”, which must be fulfilled in order to flourish. For instance, it is common to say things like, “Your lawn needs some water. It is not doing so well” And perhaps endangered species, and mountain ranges, and so on have needs and interests in this way as well. But, first, what is it that species and ecosystems WANT? To continue to exist? To remain unchanged from its original state? Or what? Second, whatever the answer to our first question, what would make it the case that my car, or a slum, or a business LACKS these sorts of “needs” or “interests”? For instance, we might say, “Your car needs a tune-up. It is not doing so well.” Does my car “want” to continue to exist? Does it have an “interest” in remaining in its pristine original state? If so, then I must have a moral obligation not to destroy it, and not to put any wear and tear on it by driving it. But, that is absurd Sober claims that this proposal is just a mis-interpretation of
Darwinism. Darwin constantly speaks of species striving to survive, and competing, and wanting things. But, natural selection is not REALLY goal-directed. Ultimately, natural selection is just an undirected, goal-less natural process. Species do not REALLY have “needs” or “desires” Those terms are just an antrhopomorphization of the process. 4 Source: http://www.doksinet 6. Intrinsic Value: It is easy to see how preserving our environment is likely to benefit US. If we destroy the environment that we live in, then we are sure to suffer But, many propose that we ought to preserve the environment FOR IT’S OWN SAKE, such that, even in cases where we cannot point to any known tangible benefits in preserving nature (e.g, nutritional, medicinal, economic, or recreational), we nevertheless have a duty to preserve it. This is true because the various species and ecosystems themselves have INTRINSIC value. But, what SORT of value do species and ecosystems have? Let’s consider 2
cases: Last Man on Earth (Art): Far in the future, the human race is about to go extinct. Even all sentient creatures (animals) have already gone extinct, and there is one man remaining, among all of the plants, lakes, rivers, and mountains (and empty cities). He plants bombs in all of the world’s famous museums and landmarks (e.g, the Louvre, the Acropolis, the pyramids, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and so on). Then, he rigs a device to his chest which, when it no longer detects his heartbeat, will set off all of the nuclear warheads in the world. The moment he dies, these bombs are detonated, and all of the world’s famous art is obliterated. Last Man on Earth (Nature): Far in the future, the human race is about to go extinct. Even all sentient creatures (animals) have already gone extinct, and there is one man remaining, among all of the plants, lakes, rivers, and mountains (and empty cities). He rigs a device to his chest which, when it no longer detects his
heartbeat, will set off all of the nuclear warheads in the world. The moment he dies, these warheads are detonated, and the entire Earthwith all of its plants, lakes, rivers, and mountains) is obliterated. Let us stipulate two additional things: (1) It is certain that no alien species will ever discover or visit Earth. (2) It is certain that, no matter what, no sentient life will ever evolve on the planet again. So, the last man is TRULY the last sentient creature to ever experience Earth. Now ask, does the last man do anything WRONG in either of these stories? Note that the environmentalist MUST answer “yes” in the second case. For, mountains and lakes and rivers have intrinsic valuetherefore, we have a moral obligation not to destroy them for no reason. If you share this intuition, then it is possible that you too think there is some VALUE to nature, in and of itselfand it ought to be preserved, not because of the good that such preservation would LEAD TO, but rather because it
is inherently good for nature to exist. It is VALUABLE (and this not to be confused with “has a MONETARY value”). 5 Source: http://www.doksinet But, what is more, typically the environmentalist wants to say that what the last man does in the first case is NOT wrong; or at least that it is much LESS wrong than what he does in the second case. Elliott Sober finds this odd WHY, he asks, would it be the case that destroying, say, Delicate Arch in Utah is morally wrong, while destroying the Roman Colosseum is not? Like Russow, Sober suggests that perhaps nature is only valuable for AESTHETIC reasons. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 stated that endangered and threatened species of wildlife and plants “are of aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.” If there are moral reasons to preserve of nature FOR IT’S OWN SAKE, then, perhaps these are the same sorts of reasons that we have to preserve famous works
of art; namely, because they are all beautiful. The idea that nature has intrinsic value for aesthetic reasons has intuitive appeal, for there are many parallels between nature and art: (1) We consider it to be a more valuable experience to see an original work of art, rather than a mere copy, even if they are identical. Similarly, we derive more value from seeing a species “in the wild”, or in its natural habitat, rather than in a zoo. (2) The aesthetic value of a work of art increases with rarity (e.g, of that artist, that style, or that period, etc.) Similarly, the aesthetic value of an organism or ecosystem increases with rarity (e.g, we derive more pleasure from seeing rare creatures than we do from seeing common ones). (3) Clearly, you would be a monster for saving a van Gogh from a burning building instead of your Mom. Similarly, you would be a monster for saving a rare snail darter from a burning building instead of your Mom. So, the value of art and nature is easily
overridden by human interests. If that is the case, then we can give the same answer about what the last man does in BOTH cases above. Either (1) he is wrong in BOTH cases, or (2) he is wrong in NEITHER casedepending upon whether or not beautiful things need valuers to be valuable. 6