Politics | Security and foreign policy » Malone-Mukherjee - Polity, Security and Foreign Policy in Contemporary India

Source: http://www.doksinet POLITY, SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA David Malone, IDRC Rohan Mukherjee, Princeton University External affairs will follow internal affairs. Indeed, there is no basis for external affairs if internal affairs go wrong. Jawaharlal Nehru, in a speech to the Constituent Assembly of India on March 8, 19481 Sixty years ago, at the dawn of independence, modern India’s first Prime Minister and Foreign Minister acknowledged the importance of domestic forces in the shaping of a country’s security environment and foreign policy. This chapter confronts a paradox: India is riven with internal conflicts that challenge state legitimacy, and levels of routine violence, often politically manipulated, that astound foreign observers. These sources of insecurity sometimes flow across its international borders, in both directions. And yet, India presents to the world, altogether credibly, the face of a rising economic and geostrategic power. It is

today, well into India’s seventh decade, hard to question its overall national cohesion as an international actor. Indeed, its pluralism, diversity, democratic practices (however chaotic at times), and multicultural make-up are all seen internationally globally as elements of strength rather than weakness, as proof of resilience rather than fragility. But viewed through a regional lens, the permeability of India’s borders with several of its immediate neighbours combined with India’s constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and the free flow of potential security threats of various sorts across these boundaries continues to preoccupy Indian policy-makers. Regional insecurities are exacerbated to a great extent by the persistence of domestic challenges to India’s national security and foreign policy. India’s domestic challenges often manifest themselves in the political sphere; hence the focus of this chapter is on the Indian polity, especially the way it interacts with India’s

society and economy. In addressing the incongruity between India’s continuing domestic insecurity and growing international stature, this chapter argues that there is in fact no real tension between the two trends. The social and political factors that complicate India’s security environment have also served to evolve its foreign policy and policymaking in a way that is consonant with its current great power ambitions. The Indian polity may not have been able to resolve its domestic problems with a great degree of success, but it has had less difficulty in promoting Indian interests in international affairs. The chapter is divided into three main parts. First, we briefly review the evolution of India’s polity and foreign policy since 1947 and address the main features of Indian 1 A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India’s Foreign Policy and Relations 1947-1972 Volume I (Oxford University Press, 1982), xxx. 1 Source: http://www.doksinet society relevant to our subject,

focusing particularly but not exclusively on the sources of insecurity arising from India’s polity and from its development model, and discussing their relevance to India’s international relations. Second, we consider two major categories of domestic factors that complicate India’s security environment – identity (ethnic, religious, national) and the institutions of India’s security and foreign policy establishment. Finally, we develop an account of how the development of India’s polity has influenced the direction of its foreign policy towards pragmatism and a great power ideology rooted in economic diplomacy. The chapter concludes that, in spite of tensions often rooted in security concerns with several of its neighbours, India is re-focusing its foreign policy beyond these regional concerns to the global level, seeing its interests today as more globally economic and (to an extent) geo-strategic than a foreign policy focused primarily on neighbours would allow. This is

both encouraging for South Asia, but in some senses worrying for India’s neighbours as the sub-region’s anchor and power-house is moving beyond them to engage more than in the past with the great powers of the day. The sustainability of this arrangement depends on the extent to which India can rediscover a moral basis for projecting its power and influence globally. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Modern Indian history can be divided into three broad time periods that overlap at the edges. The first period, in the 1950s and 1960s, features an essentially unified ideology shared by most of the Indian elite. The Congress party under Nehru enjoyed one-party dominance at home and represented a largely unified foreign policy ideology to the world. Internationally, Nehru chose the middle path of non-alignment to confound the bipolar order of the Cold War, arguing that India would have to “plough a lonely furrow.”2 This policy was followed until a border war with China in 1962 compelled the

Indian establishment to face the realities of power politics in the international system. Subsequently, having weathered further conflict with Pakistan in 1965 and leadership changes in the Congress party, both the domestic scene and India’s foreign policy began to shift. The period of the 1970s and 1980s was one of intermittent realism. The general election of 1967 marked the beginning of the decline of Congress hegemony. India Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, assumed leadership of the Congress in 1966 and by 1969 the party had split into two factions under the government and the party organization respectively. In August 1970, Mrs Gandhi told a Congress seminar that the problems of developing countries could be faced “not merely by idealism, not merely by sentimentalism, but by very clear thinking and hard-headed analysis of the situation.”3 Domestically, she used every method possible – constitutional and unconstitutional – to centralize power within her party and bring state

governments into line. While a rhetorical commitment was maintained to anti-imperialism, Third World solidarity and 2 3 Appadorai, Select Documents, 10. Appadorai, Select Documents, 62. 2 Source: http://www.doksinet non-alignment abroad, and secularism, democracy and socialism at home, a marked drift in practice towards power politics occurred in both spheres. The 1990s onwards saw the birth of pragmatism in Indian domestic politics and foreign policy. The old world order marked by the Cold War collapsed, giving way to new configurations. At home, over four decades of socialist economic policy culminated in a severe balance of payments crisis. Gradually, idealised conceptions of India’s society, polity and role in the world were mostly discarded. The new ordering of the domestic sphere revolved largely around the process of electoral and parliamentary alliance formation. Shedding anti-Western ideology in the international arena, India downplayed its earlier moral

exceptionalism, casting itself more as a nation, like any other, on a quest for power and prosperity. This produced greater normalisation of traditionally antagonistic relationships with neighbouring countries, a greater interest in international institutions that could legitimise its emerging great power status, a more positive approach to relations with the United States and, importantly, self-sufficiency in nuclear defence. Indian foreign policy in the 21st Century is characterised by pragmatism and a willingness to do business with all (an approach also reflected in much of India’s domestic politics). DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INSECURITY IN INDIA India today represents a fascinating coalescence of caste, ethnic, religious and regional groupings, often cutting across each other, that has produced arguably the world’s oldest and, during many centuries, most successful, pluralistic society. The vibrancy of its democratic experiment combined with its heterogeneous society and rapidly

growing economy has caught the attention of observers around the world. The image of India is shifting, perhaps excessively, from one of numbing poverty feebly combated by inept governments at various levels to one of an economic powerhouse rising to challenge China and perhaps one day the United States as a global actor of growing significance. But, on closer examination, is this the whole, or even an accurate, story? What of India’s continuing crushing rural poverty, its growing economic inequalities (mirroring those in much of the rest of the world), its communal divisions often expressed through sudden and breath-taking violence, its murderous insurgencies, its terrorist outrages and its increasingly fractured politics? Are these mere footnotes to the “India Shining” narrative promoted breathlessly by India boosters both within the country and internationally? Society To even the most superficial observer, the dominant characteristic of Indian society is diversity. Modern

Indian society is primarily differentiated along regional and religious lines. The Constitution of India recognises 22 official languages, each with a broadly distinct geographical coverage.4 Of the major world religions, Hindus make up 4 For more on India’s languages, see Census of India, “Abstract of Speakers’ Strength of Languages and Mother Tongues,” Part A and Part B, 2001, accessed at http://www.censusindiagovin/Census Data 2001/Census Data Online/Language/Statement1htm 3 Source: http://www.doksinet the majority of the population (80.5%), followed by Muslims (134%), Christians (23%), Sikhs (1.9%), Buddhists, Jains and others (together adding up to 19%)5 It is a testament to the absorptive capacity of Indian society that the Hindu religious tradition over the centuries has exhibited pluralistic tendencies that have in some form or another absorbed non-Hindu ideas and religious practices.6 Thus while religious conflicts did occur at times during India’s earlier

history, the broad trend has been one of coalescence and assimilation. However, the Hindu practice of stratification between castes has played a major role in creating social cleavages in modern India, and the recent political enfranchisement of the lower castes is today re-shaping India’s politics. Another critical factor has been the rise of Hindutva, a political brand of Hindu nationalism that is in constant tension with India’s multi-cultural character, and often attempts to resolve this dissonance through bouts of severe violence against religious minorities, particularly Muslims. Polity Although India is a federal republic, the Union government holds greater power than state governments, and has the authority to remove state governments in times of emergency. The scale of India’s security incidents (terrorist and separatist) is such that situations of emergency (by any international standards) abound, beyond the equally frequent political deadlocks produced by fragmented

politics at federal and state levels. The 1990s witnessed the emergence of what has come to be known as “identity politics” whereby identity, be it of caste, religion or region, is equated with interest in the political sphere, thus introducing new elements and levels of volatility – all too often with associated violence - into India’s constant negotiation with itself.7 Playing into this maelstrom, generally positively, several key sets of national actors should be mentioned: civil society organisations that have started to exert pressure on the state to fulfil its commitments to economic reform and development; India’s vibrant media – television, print and electronic – that play an important role in articulating public opinion for policymakers and facilitating debate on vital issues; the Indian bureaucracy, celebrated and reviled in equal measure, that plays a central role in implementing government policy; and the Indian judiciary, an institution that has risen to the

challenges of governance in India with considerable vigour, filling a vacuum often created by political instability and state incapacity. The Indian polity emerges as a complex arrangement of institutions, networks and relationships alternately cooperating and contending with each other in democratic government against a backdrop of deep social cleavages. Economy 5 Census of India, “Religious Composition, 2001,” accessed at http://www.censusindiagovin/Census Data 2001/India at glance/religionaspx 6 T.N Madan, “Religions of India,” in Handbook of Sociology in India, ed, Veena Das (Oxford University Press 2004), 203-222. 7 Sudipta Kaviraj, “The Nature of Indian Democracy,” in Handbook of Sociology in India, ed., Veena Das (Oxford University Press 2004), 451-470. 4 Source: http://www.doksinet Although economic liberalisation since the early 1990s has resulted in unprecedented levels of economic growth,8 India’s growth has been uneven (regionally, and among sectors of

society with agricultural productivity growth largely stagnating of late), producing new tensions in society and new threats of unrest as large numbers of rural men migrate to the urban centres where they hope to find better-paying jobs and are sometimes targeted, for example in Mumbai in 2008, as expatriate interlopers and undesirables.9 Meanwhile, the rural poor, better informed than in the past through India’s impressive telecommunications revolution, are keenly aware that very little of the money allocated to their needs by various levels of government ever reaches them. While the “trickle down” effect does operate in India – in some regions more than others – and the rising tide has lifted many boats into the burgeoning middle class, dissatisfaction with governments is rife, as expressed in India’s very strong “anti-incumbency” electoral culture. These factors create new sources of volatility and insecurity10 Social Cleavages and Political Fragmentation

Sociologist Dipankar Gupta highlights the ‘closed’ nature of stratification in the Indian caste system, where differences are predicated on invisible qualitative characteristics and mobility depends on one’s ability to ideologically question the very fundamentals of the system.11 When it comes to the distribution of economic gains in conditions of scarcity, there can hardly be any defensible intrinsic justification for such a system (despite religious doctrine). Therefore it is justified externally – hierarchy is imposed on qualitative differences using power that derives not from within the social system but through other means, notably sheer political clout. It therefore falls upon those lower down the order, if they wish to improve their conditions, to attain political power through ideologically charged appeals to their group members. And this has been going on. The federal nature of the Indian polity creates spaces where local groups can vie for the power to exercise the

autonomy afforded by the system. The central government’s negligible role in state and local spending policies allows sub-national issues to play a much larger role in voters’ preferences. Second, the existence of the single member simple plurality electoral formula, combined with the stratified nature of social institutions, allows regional identity-based parties and coalitions to effectively preclude larger “national” parties (like the Congress and BJP) from gaining majorities at state and local levels. Local political actors thus develop electoral bases that can be activated even during federal elections to gain a small degree of representation at the centre, which gains significance as parties form alliances. The cost of influencing national electoral outcomes is therefore relatively lower for smaller identity-based parties than it would have been in a single member plurality system without social 8 Atul Kohli, “Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005, Part I:

The 1980s,” Economic and Political Weekly 41, no.13 (April 01 - April 07, 2006), 1251-1259 9 Angus Deaton and Jean Dreze, “Poverty and Inequality in India: A Re-Examination,” Economic and Political Weekly 37, no.36 (September 07 - September 13, 2002), 3729-3748 10 T.N Srinivasan, “China and India: Growth and Poverty, 1980-2000,” Stanford Center for International Development, Working Paper No. 182, September 2003 11 Dipankar Gupta, “Social Stratification,” in Handbook of Sociology in India, ed., Veena Das (Oxford University Press 2004), 120-141. 5 Source: http://www.doksinet stratification.12 Third, the traditional culture of personality-oriented politics and the lack of intra-party democracy (mainly in the Congress Party, less so in the BJP) prevent existing national parties from incorporating new socio-political movements into their fold. If new socio-political movements were co-opted by the existing machinery of the large parties, it is likely that the impact of new

social cleavages on the Indian polity would be diluted. In the absence of this phenomenon, however, new movements find their expression and vitality in challenging the existing social and political structures. Together, these factors contribute to the politicisation of social cleavages in an environment of socio-economic inequalities. Against a backdrop of strong regional identities and the organization of states along linguistic lines, a range of regional political parties have emerged. The party system since the early 1990s has seen a proliferation of parties that appeal exclusively or mainly to ethnic or linguistic identities (as well, in a narrower range of cases, to caste). In the 2004 general elections, state-based parties won 30% of the seats in the lower house (Lok Sabha) with approximately 29% of the vote. Consequently, India’s major national parties (Congress and BJP) have found it difficult to obtain majorities in Parliament and coalition governments have become the norm

over the last two decades. Small regional parties with even a handful of members in Parliament are able to obtain key Cabinet positions by taking advantage of the prevailing electoral calculus, sometimes holding Cabinet to ransom on issues potentially and actually undermining national security or the government’s stated foreign policy (e.g on Sri Lanka) The picture of India that emerges is one of a heterogeneous society, a fragmented yet functioning polity and a burgeoning yet lopsided economy. As India’s economy has grown, its social diversity has manifested itself in the form of socio-economic inequalities, resulting in the uneven distribution of gains from development. These inequalities, combined with certain features of the political system, have led to the political mobilisation of hitherto excluded groups, including through the agency of new regionally and caste based political parties relying on the politics of identity. Witnessing the success of their political strategies,

parties continue to rely on identity politics, which results in the deepening of social cleavages.13 The resulting domestic scene is a fluid and unstable morass of shifting social and political alliances that complicates as much as facilitates democratic policymaking. Dealing with domestic sources of insecurity is therefore no easy task for India’s policymakers and political elite, especially when domestic factors develop linkages with broader threats in India’s security environment. DOMESTIC FACTORS AND INDIA’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT National security and foreign policy are impacted in two ways. First, at any given time, domestic compulsions influence how states act and react to events and policies of other countries in the international system. Second, the impact of domestic factors is sometimes 12 This analysis is based on Pradeep K. Chhibber, Democracy Without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India (University of Michigan Press, 1999),

15. 13 As discussed by E. Sridharan in “The Fragmentation of the Indian Party System, 1952-1999: Seven Competing Explanations,” in Parties and Party Politics in India, ed., Zoya Hasan, (Oxford University Press 2002), 475-503. 6 Source: http://www.doksinet easy to read into India’s own actions vis à vis neighbours and other States, both diplomatically and militarily. Here we focus on two main categories of factors: identity and institutions. Ethnic Identity Three kinds of domestic factors relevant to ethnic identity influence India’s policies towards certain countries. Transnational Ethnic Groups Indian populations in border regions tend to share a common ethnic and sometimes religious bond with populations in adjacent countries. This is true of Tamils and Sri Lanka, Indian Punjabis and Pakistani Punjabis, Indian Kashmiris and Pakistani Kashmiris, Indian populations bordering the Tarai region of Nepal, and even Malayalis (the people of Kerala) and the Gulf countries. By

corollary, and extending the concept to religion, it is also true of the Hindu minorities in Bangladesh and Pakistan, and Muslims in India with respect to some neighbouring countries and communities. The broad territorial division of ethnic groups within India and the strength of regional ethnic identities ensure that Indian policy towards the countries in question is always attentive to the preferences of domestic actors in these regions. This has been evinced by the sustained and vociferous support of the Tamil people and the Tamil Nadu government to the separatist movement of Tamils in Sri Lanka till the early 1990s, a fact that caused the Indian government to be heavily and sometimes unhappily involved in the ongoing conflict at various times, to the point of acquiescing in the armed tactics of the LTTE,14 launching a disastrous peacekeeping mission in Sri Lanka, and refusing military aid to the Sri Lankan army.15 More recently, in 2008, New Delhi bent to political pressure from

Tamil Nadu to intervene with the Sri Lankan government, at a time when it was in the military ascendant against the LTTE, to provide calming assurances. Similarly, the International Crisis Group reports in regard to the Madhesi movement for autonomy in the Tarai region of Nepal, that there is “widespread sympathy” in Indian border regions and “most politicians and bureaucrats do not hesitate to express moral support” for the cause.16 Secessionist Movements and Insurgencies Due to its vast size and heterogeneous society and polity, India has been the subject of various conflicts between sub-national regions and the central government. Scholars particularly attribute this to the failure of the Indian state to ensure “substantive democracy and equitable development” for large swathes of society.17 This, they argue, has resulted in the discrediting of state-sponsored nationalism and, inter alia, the rise of 14 J.N Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India’s Foreign Policy

(Picus Books, 1998), 182-193 Arun Swamy, “India in 2000: A Respite from Instability,” Asian Survey 41, no.1 (Jan - Feb 2001), 91103 16 International Crisis Group, “Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region,” Asia Report No. 136 (July 9, 2007), 22 17 Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal (eds.), Nationalism, Democracy and Development (Oxford University Press, 1997). 15 7 Source: http://www.doksinet movements aimed at establishing separate sovereign status from the Union. The history of modern India is replete with such movements, many of which are still in progress. Movements in border areas are particularly problematic because they become flashpoints with neighbouring countries, mainly due to three reasons. First, secessionist movements, especially armed movements, are likely to use the territories of adjacent countries to stage their attacks on the Indian state. This has negative consequences for the security of India’s neighbours, and makes India diplomatically vulnerable to allegations

of not doing enough to prevent its domestic conflicts from destabilizing the border regions of neighbouring countries. Second, and more importantly, the cross-border activities of secessionists create obstacles to neutralising these movements. Third, secessionist movements allow neighbouring countries with an interest in destabilising India to interfere in its internal affairs in an adverse manner. These number among the considerations that have influenced India’s policy towards Pakistan in the case of the Khalistan movement,18 towards Myanmar, Bhutan, China and Bangladesh in the case of multiple secessionist movements in the Northeast,19 and towards Nepal in the case of the Naxalite (Maoist) movement. The existence of domestic groups of insurgents and separatists therefore significantly complicates India’s security environment in South Asia. Migration: New Ethnic Groups The cross-border movement of large populations, although a version of the transnational ethnic group conundrum,

presents a conceptually distinct challenge because it involves the large-scale migration of individuals into Indian territory, transforming an international affair into one with significant domestic ramifications. The mass migration of such populations either at one time or over time results in the creation of new ethnic groups in the border (and other) regions of India, with the potential of creating security problems, particularly in relations with respective originating countries. Two examples stand out in this regard – the limited migration of Buddhist Tibetans escaping Chinese persecution, and the much larger and steady inflow of Muslim immigrants (legal and illegal) from Bangladesh into West Bengal and the North-eastern region of India. The creation and expansion of two new ethnic groups (Tibetan Buddhists and Bengali Muslims) to which post-independence Indian society was not accustomed has impacted the domestic reaction to these migrations, not least given suspicions attaching

to the purported connections between some recent terrorist attacks in India and Bangladeshi elements, and consequently impinged on India’s relations with China and Bangladesh respectively. 18 J.N Dixit, Across Borders, 146 See also K Shankar Bajpai, “India in 1991: New Beginnings,” Asian Survey 32, no.2 (Feb, 1992), 207- 216 The author writes, “howsoever limited the extent of Pakistan’s physical or logistical support to the Sikh extremists, the Pakistani nexus gave the problem an enlarged dimension; the very fact that they could look to a foreign power made the extremists infinitely harder to deal with.” 19 For a detailed account of the various secessionist movements in the Northeast, see Wasbir Hussain, “Ethno-Nationalism and the Politics of Terror in Indias Northeast,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 30, no.1 (1 April 2007), 93-110 8 Source: http://www.doksinet In the case of China, India has walked a tightrope between official recognition of Tibet as

an integral part of China and granting asylum to the Dalai Lama and his followers in Indian territory. This is largely because Tibetan migrants are relatively small in number and representatives of a globally recognized struggle (yet one that the Indian government cannot officially endorse). Also, Buddhism is accepted as a native faith in India, albeit nowadays a very minor one numerically. By contrast, the domestic sociopolitical response to Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants has been much less forgiving, partly due to their faith and partly the purely economic motive driving the migrants onto Indian soil. The reaction has been particularly violent in Assam, where riots against migrant Bengalis date back to the 1960s and 1970s. Despite some progress towards normalisation of bilateral relations with Bangladesh, complicated by a host of other issues, the migration question remains a thorn in the Indian side. A manifestation of the domestic impulse was the Indian decision to construct a

4000km concrete fence along the Indo-Bangladesh border in 1984, a project that carries on till today and has created controversy between the two countries.20 Religious Identity The importance of religion as an integral component of the Indian worldview cannot be understated. Various commentators have highlighted the weight that Indian foreign policymakers attach to the religious opinions and sentiments of India’s sizeable Muslim population, which by many accounts is the second largest in the world.21 C Raja Mohan, describes India as an “Islamic nation” with a national culture deeply influenced by Islam.22 Other members of the Indian intelligentsia have highlighted West Asia as a priority area for India not just for strategic reasons but also due to the spiritual and religious needs of India’s Muslim population. Indeed the fear of alienating this population is cited as a major reason for the lack of a noticeable Indo-Israeli relationship until the 1980s.23 India also has the

second largest Shia Muslim population in the world, which makes its ties with Iran, a Shia state, particularly relevant and sensitive. The fate of Indian Muslims is keenly followed by Iran and plays an important part in cementing a long-term relationship between the two countries.24 The impulse to accommodate the sensitivities of India’s Muslim community on at least some foreign policy issues derives more recently in part from a growing recognition that not all terrorism involving Muslims in India is likely any more to be directed from Pakistan or Bangladesh. Thus, while India’s Muslim community is viewed by some 20 Roland Buerk, “Villagers left in limbo by border fence,” BBC News, Dhaka (January 28, 2006) accessed at http://news.bbccouk/2/hi/programmes/from our own correspondent/4653810stm 21 Carin Zissis, “India’s Muslim Population,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, June 22, 2007, accessed at http://www.cfrorg/publication/13659/indias muslim populationhtml

According to the United States Department of State, however, India with its 150 million Muslims ranks third behind Indonesia (216 million) and Pakistan (162 million). See State Dept Background Notes at http://wwwstategov/r/pa/ei/bgn 22 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (Viking, 2003), xvii 23 Rajendra M. Abhyankar, “India’s West Asia policy: search for a middle ground,” in Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, ed., Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (New Delhi: Foreign Services Institute 2007). It is also asserted that the Palestinian cause remains popular among Indian Muslims 24 Harsh V. Pant, “India and Iran: An “Axis” in the Making?,” Asian Survey 44, no3 (May - Jun, 2004), 369-383. 9 Source: http://www.doksinet political movements as already a Fifth Column within the country that will respond only to a firm government hand, others believe it short-sighted to alienate in any unnecessary way a community so

large within a state so fragmented (and one with a fairly weak internal security apparatus, judging by its inability to track down the perpetrators of most recent terrorist attacks). The actual and potential interplay between some Indian Muslims and radical Muslim forces outside India has worried many in the security establishment for some time, but no consistent policy in this regard has arisen under any recent Union government. No other country has figured more prominently in the interplay of religion and India’s security than Pakistan. (In this regard, religion is more fundamental to the political identity of India than some observers recognize). India’s secular polity was forged as a conscious refutation of the idea that religion should be the basis of nationality, an idea more commonly referred to as the “two-nation theory.” While the progenitors of Pakistan considered partition to be primarily a religious phenomenon, India’s leaders viewed it as an instance of

territorial self-determination.25 This basic divergence lies at the root of India’s policy towards Pakistan and India’s position on the Kashmir issue. While Pakistan views the status of Indian-controlled Kashmir as abhorrent to the idea of Muslim nationhood (i.e a Muslim-majority state in a Hindu-majority nation), India views the Kashmir valley and surrounding territory as an integral part of its territorial identity. Moreover, Kashmir stands as a crucial test of India’s secular character – a move towards independence for Kashmir or, worse still, its accession to Pakistan would undermine India’s religious plurality while adding credibility to the two-nation theory. This could have “far-reaching, reactionary and undemocratic effects” in India.26 The rise of Hindutva was from this perspective disconcerting for many Indians in the early 1990s: its political philosophy sought to establish India as a Hindu nation, thus inadvertently legitimizing the two-nation theory. However,

when leading a Coalition in power in New Delhi, 1998-2004, the BJP proved surprisingly pragmatic. Demographic and constitutional realities dictated that, in power, it could not exclude other religions, and it maintained India’s traditional line on Kashmir. Moreover, the BJP, while playing on communal issues (as do, all too often, other Indian parties) when these offered easy pickings, mostly contested elections not on religious grounds but on issues of democracy and governance. Indeed, its Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, was instrumental in reaching out to the Pakistani leadership in an effort to initiate a peace process, which bore some fruit despite major setbacks. Nonetheless the spectre of religion as a vexing intervening variable in India’s security calculations continues to haunt its political and policymaking elites. The BJP’s own domestic actions with regard to the organized demolition of a prominent mosque (the Babri Masjid) on disputed land in 1992 and the

massacre of Muslims in Gujarat under BJP (state and federal) governments in 2002 did nothing to allay these fears, 25 26 A. Appadorai and MS Rajan, India’s Foreign Policy and Relations (South Asian Publishers, 1985), 17 Appadorai and Rajan, India’s Foreign Policy and Relations, 17. 10 Source: http://www.doksinet particularly as a domestic backlash from the India’s Muslim minority became evident through the activities of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). National Identity Transcending factors of disunity and paralysis affecting India’s foreign and domestic policies at times, and enhancing its cohesion in times of challenges, is an overriding sense of national identity to which polling suggests India’s Muslim community also strongly subscribes. In the realm of foreign policy, some scholars have found helpful the concept of “state nationalism”, or the state-sponsored idea of a nation with specific goals and a conception of how they can be achieved.27

State nationalism in India was strong in the initial years of independence, when the ideals of freedom from oppression and of anti-imperialism were carried over from the freedom struggle. Nehru’s India projected a very strong sense of national identity, reflected in some key foreign policy decisions that defined the course of India’s interactions with the world. Bhiku Parekh notes that Nehru gave India a “distinct moral voice” in the world, derived primarily from his and Gandhi’s leadership of the anticolonial struggle. In contemporary times, Parekh notes that India has developed a new identity that is a deliberate reaction to Nehruvian nationalism. It seeks to break from the Indian tradition of “poverty, moralizing and isolation” to focus more on economic and military power in foreign policy.28 This accords with most contemporary writing on Indian foreign policy, which describes it as pragmatic, realist, and a departure from the rhetorical idealism of the past. The new

pragmatism, however, threatens to erode the moral basis of India’s state nationalism. Without a strong moral thread to bind the identity of its citizens, the Indian state risks undermining its own cohesiveness and security. There is, however, little sign that those who formulate India’s security policies are capable of breathing any level of cohesion into the numerous conceptions of Indian identity that interact (and often clash) within the Indian polity. Institutions The Indian official institutions of foreign policymaking broadly encompass the Cabinet, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Indian Foreign Service (IFS), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Indian Parliament, and various manifestations of the defence and intelligence establishment (the armed forces, the Defence Research and Development Organization, the nuclear establishment, the Research and Analysis Wing, the Intelligence Bureau etc.) While the defence of India’s

territorial sovereignty is viewed as paramount by virtually all of these, the defence establishment has historically played a selective role in wider foreign policymaking (except at times of military crisis), instead understandably choosing to focus on immediate threats from within India’s neighbourhood. The broader 27 For a discussion of state nationalism in the Indian context, see Dawa Norbu, “After Nationalism? Elite Beliefs, State Interests and International Politics,” in International Relations in India: Theorising the Region and Nation, ed., Kanti Bajpai and Siddharth Mallavarapu (Orient Longman 2005), 85-116 28 Bhiku Parekh, “The Constitution as a Statement of Indian Identity,” in Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution, ed., Rajeev Bhargava (Oxford University Press 2008), 43-58 11 Source: http://www.doksinet conduct of diplomacy that spans the gamut of inter-state relations (and more recently, a range of instruments underpinning India’s “soft” power)

has traditionally been the domain of the PMO, MEA, and IFS who are accountable to Parliament through various channels. With domestic political life ever more fractured and fractious, the latter’s focus on fundamental strategic issues has declined over the years, with little attention being devoted to debating the larger goals of Indian diplomacy (a notable exception being the topic of India-US relations since 2005). Aside from the traditional concerns of inter-ministerial and intra-ministerial coordination, two main issues stand out with regard to the contemporary foreign policy establishment. Principal-Agent Problem The first pertains to a principal-agent problem that exists between the policymaking centres in New Delhi and the policy implementers on the international stage. It has often been noted that officers of the IFS, when in international forums, sometimes pursue actions that are contrary to the predefined objectives of Indian foreign policy.29 This was an acute problem soon

after the end of the Cold War, when the Indian foreign policy bureaucracy found it hard to shed its ideological baggage and traditional diplomatic attachments and to accept the changed circumstances of the international order.30 In contemporary times, it has been exemplified by unseemly turf battles between high-ranking members of the foreign policy establishment whose bureaucratic politics at home at times impact their behaviour abroad.31 Likewise, the defence establishment in India writ large (senior civilian and military retirees more than active service personnel) promote a number of their own policy preferences and flog their bêtes noires in the media with great skill and tenacity, notably China, which they continue to see as the principal threat to India (not least given its friendly ties with Pakistan). The run-up to the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to India in November 2006 was marked by near-hysterical attacks from these quarters and their political allies in the

media against Beijing’s trustworthiness as a neighbour, eventually spilling over into an unattractive debate in Parliament. Not surprisingly, the visit proved only a moderate success. Capacity The second issue is that of bureaucratic capacity. At a time when a degree of specialisation is highly prized in the administration of foreign affairs in many capitals, some analysts believe Indian officials, though often highly talented, are too frequently compelled to be generalists, being spread (all too thinly) across the spectrum of Indian diplomacy.32 Indeed, the shortage of Indian government trade negotiators is such that in 29 K.P Saksena, “India’s Foreign Policy: The Decisionmaking Process,” International Studies 33, no4 (August 1996), 391-405. 30 Sumit Ganguly, “Indian Foreign Policy Grows Up,” World Policy Journal (Winter 2003/04), 41-47. 31 For an instance of this, see George Iype, “War in MEA cripples India’s battle for world support,” Rediff News (July 14, 1998),

accessed at http://www.rediffcom/news/1998/jul/14bomb4htm 32 Devesh Kapur, “India in 1999,” Asian Survey 40, no.1 (Jan - Feb, 2000), 195-207 12 Source: http://www.doksinet recent years New Delhi has increasingly and sensibly resorted to private sector lawyers and sectoral experts to buttress the bureaucratic cadre. Inevitably, the limited number and capacity of personnel, combined with a plethora of international and multilateral demands and commitments, results in “the best [having] unbelievable demands placed upon them”, yielding an overworked, underpaid and under-appreciated bureaucracy.33 A challenge of a different order arises from the questionable performance of both India’s internal intelligence apparatus (mainly, the Intelligence Bureau) and the oncefabled external intelligence operatives of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the leadership of which increasingly became an embarrassment in the years 2007-2008. The failure of Indian intelligence to anticipate a

number of murderous terrorist attacks within India, notably in Mumbai in November 2008, or apprehend most of those responsible over the years, speaks not just to weak, under-motivated and under-equipped police forces but also to dubious intelligence capabilities. The reputation of India’s Armed Forces has fared better, not least because of their controlled response to a number of potentially very dangerous crises (e.g Kargil), the professionalism of their contributions to UN peacekeeping, and the care they take with training. India’s navy has been a great asset in building Indian military ties with partners around the world. That said, even the Armed Forces, never keen on police duties, have not always performed gently or effectively in domestic theatres of conflict such as Kashmir and Assam. The diffusion of authority between leading institutions (the PMO, the National Security Council, the MEA and the MoD) exacerbates the challenges of decision-making faced by the foreign policy

establishment, which were critically highlighted in its handling of the Kargil crisis with Pakistan.34 Indeed the disproportionate concentration of authority within a small PMO relative to other actors, a reflection of wider international trends, in India’s case may be problematic as New Delhi juggles more diplomatic and security-related balls than do all but a very few capitals.35 That said, the creation of a National Security Adviser providing forward impetus and in a position to arbitrate differences between other foreign policy actors has doubtless been helpful and, as India emerges as a relevant player on the geo-strategic stage, indeed indispensable. But bureaucratic factors as well as political distraction are largely behind a sense among Indian authors (and some others) that the country lacks effective coordination at the international level, and have produced a foreign policy and security strategy that some view as reactive and bereft of strategic vision, highlighted in

charges of “ad hocism” and “drift.”36 33 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Not so credible India,” Indian Express (April 24, 2008). Devesh Kapur, “India in 1999,” 206. 35 K.P Saksena, “India’s Foreign Policy,” 9 36 Harsh V. Pant, “Four years of UPA: Foreign policy adrift,” Rediff News (May 12, 2008), accessed at http://www.rediffcom/news/2008/may/12guesthtm 34 13 Source: http://www.doksinet THE INDIAN POLITY AND FOREIGN POLICY Thus far, this chapter offers a static account of the essentially domestic security factors that shape India’s security environment and foreign policy at any given point in time. However, it is possible to derive a link between long-term changes on the domestic scene and changes in foreign policy, especially in the contemporary era. Two important caveats must be made at the outset. First, this account does not in any way detract from the centrality of some external influences in the formulation of India’s foreign policy. Second, it does not

detract from the importance of individual leadership in policymaking, especially in a world where important outcomes can turn on the basis of personal relationships and leadership styles. The basic argument is therefore simple: holding constant the impact of external events and individual personalities, the evolution of India’s domestic political and security challenges and system since independence has been an important factor in shaping the way Indian leaders have perceived and defined the national interest. Not least, to a degree, domestic socio-political change has influenced Indian foreign policy over time. The approach below relies on observed qualitative correlations between changes in the domestic political structure and security challenges and changes in India’s foreign policy. Correlation does not imply causation However, an attempt is made to develop an account of causation that is grounded in the dynamics of India’s society, internal security, polity and economy.

Critical to this analysis is the reality that potential security threats are permeable across most of India’s borders, arising from such diverse factors as migration to and from Nepal and Bangladesh, to deep emotional ties of kinship linking Tamils in South India to their cousins in Sri Lanka. Understanding Domestic Influences Structural Factors The history of the modern Indian society and polity so far can be viewed as one long struggle to accommodate extreme heterogeneity. Social cleavages, translated into socio-economic inequalities and supported by certain constitutional features of the Indian polity, have led to fragmentation of the political space since the end of the Nehru era, when the unified ideologies of post-Independence nationalism had somewhat lost their sheen. A convulsive period of forced centralization of power under India Gandhi only strengthened centrifugal forces in Indian society. This evolution produced serious implications for foreign policy. Fragmentation of

the political space allowed divergent views on India’s role in the world to emerge in public debate. The decline of single-party dominance and the emergence of alternate national governments allowed the articulation of alternative worldviews within the policymaking establishment. Thus, diverse foreign policy ideologies such as the “genuine non-alignment” of the 1977 Janata government,37 or the “Gujral Doctrine” of the late 37 This was articulated as a course-correction in reaction to the tilt in India foreign policy towards the Soviet Union under Indira Gandhi. 14 Source: http://www.doksinet 1990s,38 or the “Hindu Rashtra” of the BJP at the turn of the century,39 came into play as soon as the political space began to fragment. Even Rajiv Gandhi deviated from the policies of his mother in the 1980s and gave priority to better relationships with India’s neighbours. Political Fragmentation and Ideological Incoherence A fairly direct result of the diffusion of power

and the proliferation of views within India’s political space was the growing ideological incoherence of Indian foreign policy, which manifested itself in a number of incremental shifts by successive Indian governments substantially modifying established policy or completely reversing it. A trace of this is evident in the Indian response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Janata government reacted with strong disapproval of Moscow’s actions in the United Nations. A month later, India Gandhi regained power and, more committed to India’s relationship with the USSR, substantially toned down the Indian stand in the UN.40 Similarly, Rajiv Gandhi’s approach to regional cooperation led him to pledge an Indian Peacekeeping Force (the IPKF) to oversee the devolution of power to the local Tamil government as part of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987. Subsequently, the V.P Singh government in 1989 ordered the immediate withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka. This

resulted in a power vacuum as India withdrew, leaving the LTTE rebels to fill the political space vacated by the Indian forces.41 India’s biggest reversal, however, occurred during the second Gulf crisis of 199091. Under VP Singh as Prime Minister and IK Gujral as Foreign Minister, India initially took a strong stance in the UN in September 1990 counter to America’s unilateral action against Iraq and to the UN’s related decision-making process. By November, the Singh government had been replaced by another minority coalition led by Chandra Shekhar. The new government immediately condemned Iraq for its actions and, in a highly controversial decision, allowed American and Australian airplanes to refuel on Indian territory en route to the Gulf.42 Arguably, as a result of the incoherence that characterises a fragmented political system expressing itself in foreign policy (a familiar feature of foreign policy in several Western democracies), Indian foreign policy has become largely

reactive in nature. It is criticised at home and abroad for lacking vision and a unified strategy for India’s role in 38 This was primarily based on the idea of non-reciprocity in India’s relations with its neighbours, on the principle that as the state with the greatest stake in maintaining South Asian stability, India should be willing to give more than it receives in its bilateral relations with neighbours. 39 This was premised on the political goal of shaping India into a Hindu nation. 40 J.N Dixit, Across Borders, 134-138 41 J.N Dixit, Across Borders, 187 42 See J. Mohan Malik, “Indias Response to the Gulf Crisis: Implications for Indian Foreign Policy,” Asian Survey 31, no.9 (Sep, 1991), 847-861 15 Source: http://www.doksinet the world.43 But while some Indians argue that the country needs an ideological basis on which to project its power, there is no prospect of wide agreement on what such an ideology should contain. Decision-making and the National Interest The

lack of an agreed framework for India’s international relations among its principal political actors has affected decision-making in Indian foreign policy. But the persistence of coalition government (even in the current loosely bipolar setup of two large blocs) and the tortuous nature of foreign policy decision-making within the government have made the cost of significant departures from existing foreign policies politically and institutionally steep, as highlighted by the tumultuous negotiations and then early implementation of the Indo-US nuclear agreement, 2005-2008. In practice, at best the establishment aims for incremental change. At worst, decisions are based on the lowest common denominator, which can be nothing but an often ill-defined appeal to national interest (seen through a variety of lenses in today’s India). However, there is one element of the national interest that most foreign and domestic actors agree on, and that is the logic of economics. Economics as the

New Ideological Anchor India’s Finance Minister, P. Chidambaram in 2007, had the following to say about India’s emergence as an economic power: India is respected not because it has acquired the capacity to launch rockets or satellites, or because of the size of its population, or because of its dominant presence in Asia. The world respects India because of its capacity to emerge as an economic powerhouse.44 In the new century, the pursuit of economic growth has displaced previous Indian foreign policy ideologies. The nation’s rapid and positive response to liberalisation since 1991 has unleashed social, political and of course economic forces that many believe makes India “unstoppable” (temporary market-driven reverses such as those of 20082009 notwithstanding). Political parties of all stripes agree, albeit for different reasons, that economic growth is a good thing for India (although rising inequality is flayed by parties of the left as a national scandal). From a

foreign policy perspective, economic prosperity (the “tide that lifts all boats”)45 is now seen as the key to India’s attainment of great power status, and it is the driving argument behind India’s current world view. No longer willing to lead the poor nations of the Third World in a struggle against imperialism, and no longer wishing to project its power merely within the conflicted confines of its own neighbourhood, India is pressing its suit on the world stage, not least within the World Trade Organization, in the company of such other rising, essentially 43 See C. Raja Mohan, “Peaceful Periphery: Indias New Regional Quest,” Center for the Advanced Study of India (24 May, 2007). Also see Pratap Bhanu Mehta (“Not so credible India,” Indian Express) and Harsh V. Pant (“Four years of UPA,” Rediff News) 44 P. Chidambaram, “India Empowered To Me Is,” in A View from the Outside: Why Good Economics Works for Everyone, P. Chidambaram (Penguin 2007) 45 Chidambaram,

“India Empowered To Me Is,” in A View from the Outside. 16 Source: http://www.doksinet “emerged” powers as Brazil and South Africa, partly egged on by the worryingly faster pace of Chinese development.46 Indeed trade and bilateral economic cooperation have become the cornerstones of India’s relations with the world, even with China. India no longer discriminates significantly between Russia, America, Israel, Iran, and the ASEAN countries (although restrictions on Chinese investment remain significant, driven by security considerations). It is formally willing to do business with all, even those in its neighbourhood, through the South Asia Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA). Both moralising and power politics on the international stage are now viewed as potentially bad for business, whereas economic linkages are seen to promote stability. Thus India is currently engaged in promoting economic development in Africa, securing oil fields in Central Asia, promoting trade

and nuclear cooperation with the US, receiving remittances from its 3.5 million workers in the Gulf, and acting as Israel’s biggest arms market. This is not to say that ideology and power politics are no longer important. India still accords priority to security issues and retains its nuclear weapons option. However, at the NAM summit in Havana, 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s speech focused on anti-terrorism, ‘inclusive globalisation’, nuclear disarmament, energy security and investing in Africa – issues that are vital to India’s global agenda but not necessarily top priorities for developing countries worldwide. On balance, it is clear that modern India prefers to articulate and prioritize its own national interests over the collective interests of developing countries.47 More importantly, the nature of Indian concerns is morphing from those of a captious regional power to those of a more confident global power that derives its stature from economic success. As its

economic stake in the international regime grows, India is increasingly choosing strategic cooperation over competition or confrontation in its relations with other nations (along the lines of China’s contemporary approach). Today, India’s foreign policy can be described, as Pratap Bhanu Mehta puts it, as one of “unprincipled moderation”.48 While most countries practice double standards in expressing their values, India is notable for expressing few principles beyond that of “non-interference” in the affairs of others (actually practiced less selectively by Delhi than it is in many other capitals). However, its moderation of recent years is a major asset for international relations, not to be underestimated at the global level. 46 India’s stance on trade issues is arguable shaped as much by domestic political considerations as purely economic ones. Standing up to the (largely indefensible) US and EU positions on agricultural trade within the Doha Round WTO negotiations

in mid-2008 was a domestically no-lose proposition, not least following a crisis in food security globally and within India, earlier that year. India’s talented and charismatic trade minister at the time, Kamal Nath, did his political party more good by confronting the main trading blocks than in seeking to compromise with them (as did Brazil). But political considerations also had the upper hand in EU and US calculations. 47 Full text of speech available at http://www.canadaupdatescom/news/text of manmohan singhs speech at nam summit-24018html 48 In remarks at the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 22 October 2008. 17 Source: http://www.doksinet CONCLUSION Social heterogeneity and political fragmentation have over the years been the underlying causes of numerous challenges to India’s domestic stability (particularly in the present era of high yet uneven economic growth). Through the political process, they have also complicated the management of India’s

domestic security and external security environment. Yet by impinging on the ability of India’s foreign policymakers to forge a coherent ideological foundation, they have also led India’s foreign policy down a more pragmatic path and (almost by default) anchored it on the imperatives of economic diplomacy. The over-riding driver of foreign policy has emerged as pragmatism in support of the “national interest,” most widely seen today as rooted in the economy. Therefore although India’s continuing domestic insecurity and growing international stature may seem incongruous to many observers, there is no fundamental tension between the two trends. Both are products of the same background conditions and political processes. Indeed India’s potential as a global economic powerhouse is viewed by many domestic leaders as the surest way of improving domestic security (understood broadly) through greater and more equitably shared prosperity. Nevertheless, a foreign policy rooted

exclusively or even primarily in economics may not work indefinitely for India, for three reasons. First, as was obvious in 2008 and 2009, greater integration into the world economy is likely over time to render India more vulnerable to global shocks and imbalances. Second, although current levels of growth, if sustained, can take India a long way towards becoming a major power, it is quite likely that future economic growth may not be sustained at the levels witnessed in the years 2006-2007. Third, no matter how well the Indian economy fares, it is not likely in the decades immediately ahead to be as productive as that of its neighbour China. Without a more unified vision and strategy for its international role, encompassing more than policies designed to enhance and capitalize on economic growth, India may to find it hard to achieve a seat a the high table of international relations. Without a concurrent political agenda, a comprehensive defence policy – with effective humanitarian

reach - and a clearer vision for India’s place in the world and what it wishes to contribute to the rest of humanity, economic growth and integration are unlikely alone to produce a winning foreign policy. It is in this light that the potential of India’s developing relationship with the United States may best be appreciated. Although cast domestically in terms of national interest, the focus in Washington on shared values in the relationship associated with liberal constitutional democracy may offer India a wider canvas on which to sketch its global aims, for developing influence and projecting power on a global scale. Whether India’s fractious domestic scene can credibly support such a strategy of course remains to be seen. 18